

UN Senior Mission Leadership Development and Training
PKSOI PSOTEW WORK GROUP 2 – FINAL REPORT
1 July 2016

INTRODUCTION

The 2016 Peace and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) convened by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in Rockville, Maryland, during 6 to 8 April 2016. The conference focused the attention of United States and international participants representing more than 30 military and civilian organizations on the theme: *Identifying and Implementing Peace and Stabilization Training and Education Best Practices*.

Senior leader development and training was the principal topic addressed by PSOTEW 2016 Working Group 2. UN senior **leadership development** is a **key** strategic issue raised in both the UN High Level Panel Report on all aspects of Peace Operations and the 2014/15 UN Training Architecture Review and also noted in the 2015 Presidential Memorandum on ‘US Support to United Nations (UN) Peace Operations’ published after the US Presidential Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015.

This summary of the working group’s leadership development and training discussion is intended to generate further interest, dialogue and innovation in the subject.

PART I BACKGROUND

PEACE OPERATIONS 2016

Peace Operations today have three key characteristics – Multicultural (involving civilian, military, and police components), Multidimensional (with multiple objectives and lines of activity) and Multinational. Moreover the complexities and challenges of peace operations require that the international response be, to the degree possible and practical, an effective joint effort. The UN uses the term ‘integrated missions,’ while others use the term and concept of ‘comprehensive approach’ in describing the desired operational concept. **A clarification of terminology is attached at Annex A.**

In purely military operations and/or humanitarian relief operations, and/or disaster response operations, the various professional communities involved are accustomed to the multinational characteristic, i.e., working with other nationalities. What sets today’s peace operations apart are the multidimensional and multicultural nature of the response to a crisis in a challenging security environment.

Another important and particularly relevant characteristic of peace operations today is the fact the lead for most of the many dimensions of peace operations rests with senior civilians. Moreover, given the increasing focus and importance of rule of law, the impact of

transnational organized crime, and the need for security sector reform, the engagement of UN Police (UNPOL) in mission planning, training, and operations is critical.

All of this is further complicated by the fact that each component has a different training culture and professional expertise, ranging from intense and routine in the military, with varied training cultures among police forces, and many different civilian efforts ranging from virtually none to more advanced training concepts. And much of this particular aspect of leadership formation within all cultures can vary significantly from country to country.

Accordingly, the leadership in all organizations involved in such operations (at all levels, but in particular the senior leaders) need first to understand the many dimensions of peace operations, and second to understand the roles, responsibilities, strengths, limitations and operational concepts of the many different (multicultural) components of today's peace operations. Therefore, at the heart of dealing with the many complexities of peace operations is the clear need for effective civilian/military/police collaboration; led by officials who both understand the requirement and are willing to practice the same; supported by teams/staffs (to include a strong Chief of Staff (or second)) and mid-level leaders with similar skills, understandings and attributes.

A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT -- CIVILIAN - MILITARY - POLICE RELATIONS

As suggested above, the fundamental requirement for all involved in peace operations, especially senior leaders, is to understand and execute effective civilian-military-police relations. Over the past 20 years, beginning in the main with the situation in Bosnia in 1995, the requirement for closer collaboration, consultation, cooperation and coordination became evident. Concepts for civilian/military cooperation and coordination were developed and refined in the late 1990s and into the 21st century. Tools such as military civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) came to the fore. However, this was not intended to leave cooperation across the civilian/military/police components solely to CIMIC cells or other specialists. Instead, the gradual realization by the international community is that in today's peace operations civilian, military, and police activities cannot be compartmentalized and instead leaders and key operations staffs must ensure that they are conducted in closer collaboration/coordination to achieve mission success

There are a number of critical challenges to achieving effective understanding and collaboration in today's peace operations. These are detailed in Annex B but include: professional cultural differences; language and communications differences; a range of leadership styles and personalities; rigid institutional mandates and their interpretation; competition for resources; differing levels of authority and accountability; overstretch or excessive workload; trust and confidentiality among participants; ignorance due to lack of adequate pre-mission training and education in civilian-military-police relations; simple cultural misunderstandings; realities and dilemmas that need to be accommodated; and differing national interests and interpretations.

Only the integrated education and training of civilian-military-police can begin to overcome the many challenges listed above. This needs to be done nationally and regionally and, to the extent possible and practical, should be exercised prior to deployments. Peace operations leadership is not something that can be learned ‘on-the-job’ whilst in the heat of a multitude of challenges and tasks and in a difficult security environment.

SENIOR LEADERS EDUCATION AND TRAINING 2016

Much already exists in the realm of senior leader education and training. Some is of a particularly high quality, refined over the past few years with the assistance and input from experienced senior leaders. A key challenge with such training is that not enough leaders take such training. This is a result of the selection processes of organizations, regions and nations; moreover, many who take such training are not subsequently deployed to or in any way further involved in UN peace operations. Further, 2015 evaluation by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found that more than one-third of the senior leaders in UN missions had not taken the UN’s Senior Leadership Programme or Senior Mission Leader course (SML) – among current mission leadership, 28.4 per cent had not taken any Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/Department of Field Support (DFS) leadership training.

As the principal UN-owned mechanism for the education and training of senior leaders destined for missions overseas, the SML is designed to prepare potential mission leaders for a UN peacekeeping operation; it is organized jointly by a host member-state and DPKO/DFS, represented by the UN’s Integrated Training Service (ITS). The objectives of the SML course are to prepare potential mission leaders for the roles and responsibilities of senior leaders in UN peacekeeping operations and to enable member-state officials responsible for UN peacekeeping issues to better understand how current UN peacekeeping operations are managed. The participants are a balanced multicultural group of senior officials.

Variants of the UN SML course have been developed, including one for the African Union (AU) and sub-regional entities. There is also a senior leaders’ course developed by the European Union (EU) to prepare EU senior officials for EU crisis management missions (‘common security and defense policy missions,’ CSDPs). The European Security and Defence College also conducts leadership training for CSDP missions, as well as strategic planning courses. Through the US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) also offers leadership training based originally on the UN SML and in response to requests from TCCs/PCCs.

In addition to the SMLs, the DPKO/DFS also conducts the Senior Leadership Program (SLP), formerly known as the Senior Leadership Induction Program (SLIP), which is a mandatory five-day course intended to provide newly-appointed senior leaders in field missions with an orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as the main challenges faced when implementing mandates and the relationship between the field and UN headquarters. Since 2012, the UN’s ITS and the UN Office of the Military Advisor (OMA) have successfully organized the Intensive Orientation Course for Heads of Military Components (HOMCs).

The main objective of the course is to prepare appointed/designated HOMCs so as to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities with maximum proficiency in UN peace operations.

UN OIOS EVALUATION OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP TRAINING

In 2015 the OIOS evaluated the current state of leadership training in the UN system. It developed seven recommendations, which have been accepted by DPKO and DFS:

1. DPKO/DFS should develop and implement a comprehensive and systematic senior leadership orientation and training strategy for newly appointed leaders, ensuring a 'full spectrum, whole of DPKO/DFS effort;'
2. Ensure that no new appointee to a senior leadership position deploys without completing a specified minimum of training and preparation and providing all new senior leadership appointees with an on-boarding focal point;
3. Ensure that every senior leader appointed to a senior level position in peacekeeping operations completes at least one DPKO/DFS senior leadership training course within the first six month of his/her appointment;
4. Allocate sufficient funds for advance planning, preparation and delivery of the Senior Mission Leaders course;
5. Establish performance indicators and specific targets for the planned outcomes of the Senior Mission Leaders course;
6. Develop mission-specific handbooks tailored to suit the information and knowledge needs of senior leaders; and
7. Develop mission specific crisis management training for Mission Leadership Teams.

PART II - WORK GROUP #2 OBJECTIVES AND DELIVERABLES

Against this background and understanding of peace operations in 2016, PSOTEW WG#2 addressed the subject of senior mission leader development, education and training from four perspectives: an identification of the key senior leader attributes with regard to knowledge, skills and abilities as well as other characteristics; identification of the resources available or required to deliver training needs; identification of optimal delivery methods; and, identification of a community of practice to advance such education and training.

1. Senior Leader knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics

UN Senior Mission Leader designation is often a political process whereby political considerations sometimes outweigh leader competencies. Ideally, requisite UN senior leader knowledge would include an understanding of the many dimensions of peace operations, a comprehensive appreciation of the roles, responsibilities, capabilities and limitations of all of the mission components, and civilian-military-police relations and an awareness of the challenges of missions in transition. Prior to deployment, senior mission leaders would also need to have a sound understanding of cross-cutting topics, such as the

mandate, the legal framework, and the UN's organizational structure and rules and regulations, as well as how to deal with key current challenges, such as protection of civilians (PoC), while promoting the highest standards of conduct, especially in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

In addition the group considered the following 'desirable' skills and abilities of a peace operations senior leader: communications, team-building, diplomacy, adaptability, time/resource/financial management, negotiation and mediation, cultural attunement as well as proficiency in UN mission language.

'Leadership' has been defined by some as *'the art of influencing people to achieve desired outcomes'*. US behavioral research has suggested three 'higher order meta-competencies': adaptability across organizations and cultures; building partnering relationships; and collaboration to solve problems that encompass twelve competencies for successful civil military teaming (See Annex C Competency Model for Civil - Military Teaming). In addition to adopting a competency model the UN would benefit from the development of an ideal leader profile with desirable characteristics such as flexibility, charisma, integrity, courage, patience, character, vision, tenacity and the ability to inspire.

Packaging the knowledge, skills, abilities and characteristics into a 'desirable profile' would support senior leader (and senior staff) selection for peace operations deployment as well as education and training, and for consideration by those developing the national education and training progressions of officials – military, civilian and police.

2 – Resources - Available and Required

Current available senior leadership training includes the UN Senior Mission Leaders Course, other SML Courses such as the Regional variants offered by the UN, the AU and its sub-regions, and the EU, noting that the latter is focused on preparing leaders for specific European CSDP missions. There are also additional preparations available in the UN system for senior leaders under the SLP (Senior Leadership Program) and newly appointed force commanders and deputy commanders under the HOMC described above. In addition, some leadership training is offered by donors/partners, such as within the US GPOI program, but this training is not necessarily to UN standards and is frequently designed to address specific regional/national requests.

The flagship UN SML course, which is conducted once or twice every year and hosted by a volunteer member-state, is the cornerstone for the UN of a comprehensive / systematic UN Senior Leaders Training System and Strategy, (as requested by the above-mentioned OIOS report). With such experience the UN is strategically placed to set the standard for UN and related senior leader training, including that delivered by donors, partners and, to the extent appropriate, by regional and sub-regional organizations. To this end, the UN should develop/maintain oversight of content, participants, planning and implementation of such senior leader courses.

In looking at the challenges facing the UN SML concept today, it can be concluded that the UN could usefully benefit from 3 'international' contributions:

- More systematic funding from UN member-states and/or donor organizations
- Identification and volunteering for UN SML service of Qualified SMEs (subject matter experts) and experienced course facilitators
- Contributions to updating the SML Scenario (Carana), where US CCMR currently has an interest but there is room for other support

In addition to the education and training of senior leaders, it is important that much of the knowledge and many of the skills and attributes are developed and present among key staffs and mid-level management – both uniformed and civilian personnel. It is important, for example, in the police community because most individual police officers arrive without any relevant leadership training and yet fully 13% of all police positions in UN missions are at the mid-level of mission leadership. Civilian mid-level leaders also head local field offices, and senior civilian staffs provide advice, take relevant decisions, and otherwise directly support, the senior leadership.

Mid-Level Leadership Training: A major potential for developing and delivering such mid-level leadership education and training perhaps exists in many national or regional training centers. For example, there are already various GPOI programs, especially support for US military geographic combatant command (GCC) regional training activities in response to TCC and PCC requests. There are also relevant bilateral programs delivered by training partners and other donor programs such as those of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). US organizations such as CCMR, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and others are engaged in such outreach training, and potentially could be a part of any effort to extend the capacity for leadership training.

Continuity in Training: The preparation of leaders for crisis management in complex peace operations should not start with an assignment to such a mission; there is a need to look at the 'continuum of education and training' in a leader's profession. Peace operations leadership competencies can and should be developed over the normal progression of one's career, in the military, the police, in the UN Agencies and even in most other civilian professions. The 'how', 'when,' and 'where' to begin to inject such specialized peace operations education and training will vary by professional culture and by nation. Consideration of this continuity dimension generates four specific recommendations:

- There needs to be a progressive knowledge of peace operations and development of requisite skills;
- The planning, implementation and evaluation of such training needs, progressively, should have a balanced integrated input – military, civilian and police;
- Training, to the extent possible, should be integrated – courses and exercises, for example, should have military, police and civilian participants;

- Information on such a concept and the requirement need to be discussed with, and understood by, principal TCCs and PCCs, and within other deploying organizations (NGO etc).

Lastly, there should be an attempt to minimize the politicization of the leadership selection process as it also impacts the ability of UN agencies to integrate when individuals selected may not have the competency to lead integrative agencies in the missions.

3 – Optimal Delivery Methods

There are a number of existing and potential education and training delivery means. Aside from the normal courses and exercises there is much to be learned through ‘distance learning,’ or blended learning (comprising distance and courses/exercises). In addition, leaders can learn through effective mentoring, either formally in a mission or more informally in mission or prior to deployment. Most of all however, and as touched upon above, this education and training needs to be done, to the degree possible, in an integrated fashion - a mixed group military, civilian and police training participants. In particular, senior leadership training needs to be integrated so that individuals understand and practice the challenges of working in integrated leadership teams early.

One relatively new and promising concept is the use of simulation and scenario-based ‘table top’ learning. While not new to the military, this is an area of considerable potential for more integrated education and training, especially in addressing challenging new concepts such as protection of civilians. Bringing together mission management to look at ‘team-building’ options in dealing with specific situations in a mission area depicted on a table top type system has already been developed and used by the UN, supported by some training organizations including from the US (PKSOI, for example).

A further proven integrated training concept is the Swedish-led, US-supported, multinational Viking concept – a 10 day training exercise planned, conducted and evaluated by a balanced team of civilians, police and military – and involving a training audience of not just military, but also civilians and police officials. Interaction between DPKO and the Viking organizers has increased in recent years. Where appropriate, DPKO involvement in the planning and conduct of such exercises offer opportunities to introduce important aspects of UN peacekeeping to a wide range of civilian, military and civilian police participants from many member-states.

The challenges to developing and instituting integrated training, however, are significant. The military has a training culture, conducts many courses relevant to peace operations, has over time developed sophisticated ‘exercise’ training platforms, and is comfortable with the concept of table top exercises and the use of simulation in training. However, the military needs to move to a more ‘civilians as a training audience (and planner) partner’, though there are resource implications – some of which are not yet understood by prospective non-military partners.

A related challenge is developing a culture of a true partnership – from conceptualization, through development, and on to implementation and evaluation – which is required when being coordinated or trained by other cultures, especially by another country's military. The Swedish model and concept referenced above took years to develop and perfect, but is now sound in practice and accepted by all cultures (including participating groups and staffs from more than 50 countries).

One other area of content delivery touched upon was that of simulation. Simulation is increasingly and effectively used in field exercises, classroom, table-top training scenarios and distributed computer-assisted exercises. New techniques, designed specifically to support leadership training, are being developed and tested. One specific example is offered by CCMR. Wider use of such simulation may facilitate an increase in both the quantity and quality of leadership training, and (integrated) peace operations training in general.

In delivering the training, the operational environment should be an integrated mission and/or the use of a 'comprehensive approach to operations' as the normal operational model for which to train.

Following these considerations there are four recommendations:

- To the greatest extent possible peace operations education and training should be planned, conducted and evaluated in an integrated manner;
- Nations need to consider further resourcing the UN's Mission Mentoring Program, and/or develop an expert national mentoring capability to support deployed leaders;
- Nations should support development of Simulations for UN SL Training for Peace Operations;
- Nations should also support the UN Team Building Exercise Initiative.

4 – A Community of Practice

There are many stakeholders in the business of the education and training of not only senior leaders but also of 'mid-level management' and of key staff members of senior leaders. The UN, regional and defense organizations, national and regional training organizations, distance-learning systems such as that of the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI), the US GCC training system, programs of donor programs and nations, and educational and training associations such as the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and its four regional variants (the European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres, EAPTC; the Africa Peace Support Trainers Association, APSTA; the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers, AAPTC; and the American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations, ALCOPAZ) are all potential members of such a community. There is, however, no good and structured information on the international capability in this regard.

Accordingly, UN DPKO/DFS might consider taking an inventory of existing programmes for senior mission leaders in order to establish regular information exchange among relevant institutions regarding calendars, content, methodology, participants, as well as improve coordination in communication to member-states and potential course participants. Such an inventory should be informed by an assessment by the UN Secretariat of the totality of senior mission leadership training requirements and should underscore the lead coordinating role of ITS. A concerted effort should be made to identify training already provided by various actors; identify gaps, duplication, and potential inconsistencies; and clarify comparative advantage and assign roles and responsibilities among various training actors. Collaborative arrangements could be explored with the four regional peacekeeping training associations with respect to senior leadership training. Particular attention should be given to induction training for senior leaders.

There also needs to be closer collaboration between TCCs, PCCs and others with both the UN and with donors/partner nations/programs with respect to the training continuum issue, improving the level and amount of integrated training, and specific leadership training aimed at mid-level leaders and key staffs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended therefore that with respect to senior leadership development and training:

1. Skills, abilities, as well as other characteristics considered be packaged in a '**Senior Leadership Profile**' (along the lines of competency model at Annex C) and made available to educators and trainers and also made available to the UN for possible use by SML facilitators and those involved in selection processes for SML candidates;
2. The **UN SML Course** be considered the cornerstone of a comprehensive and systematic UN Senior Leaders' Training Strategy. In addition:
 - a. The UN standards for UN Senior Leader Training should be the basis for any regional or national training that aims at preparing senior leaders for UN missions;
 - b. The UN (ITS) should have oversight of the content, participant selection, planning and implementation of national SML training;
 - c. UN member-states and national training institutions should consider assisting the UN with its SML program through contributions to systematic funding, identification and provision of qualified SMEs and facilitators; and assistance in updating the SML scenario (Carana);
 - d. UN DPKO and DFS should consider participation in the SML course as a factor in reviewing potential candidates for senior appointments, and maximize the utility and relevance of the SML course and other senior leadership training for improving the preparation of prospective appointees and the induction and ongoing training support of mission leadership through methodologies such as table top exercises (TTXs), gaming and simulations.

- e. Individuals should arrive at the course with a certification verifying a level of UN knowledge prior to arrival at the course. (requires development of online – pre-SML version)
3. Member-states, and in particular UN TCCs and PCCs, consider the need to develop a **Peace Operations - Leadership Development - Training Continuum** through progressively developing the necessary skills and knowledge of Peace Operations in an official's or officer's career education and training;
4. Education and training institutions strive, to the extent possible to **plan, implement and evaluate peace operations training** in an integrated manner; includes having an **integrated training audience** in all of their peace operations courses and exercises
5. Donors, training partners, education and training programs and training institutions focus on three needs –first, to develop and promote **mid-level leadership education and training**; second, to promote the need for all deploying to peace operations to participate a **civilian/military/police relations course**; and third, to emphasise and support the aforementioned **integrated nature of peace operations training**;
6. UN DPKO/DFS assess outsourcing **options for leadership training**, including within the wider UN system, but with a focus on mid-level leadership development;
7. Education and Training Institutions consider contributions to the resourcing of the UN's **Mission Mentoring** Program;
8. Education and training institutions consider support to the development of **Simulations** for UN Senior Leader Training for Peace Operations;
9. Education and training institutions consider support for the UN **Team Building Exercise** Initiative; and
10. DPKO/DFS consider taking an inventory of programmes for senior mission leaders and establish regular information exchange among relevant institutions regarding calendars, content, methodology, participants, as well improve coordination in communications / standardize to Microsoft and potential course participants

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Acknowledgments

We also appreciate the sage advice and support for our UN Senior Mission Leadership project through discussions and commentary on the Working Group's development and outcomes as well as partnership in future endeavors:

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SENIOR LEADERS EDUCATION AND TRAINING WG #2 REPORT

TERMINOLOGY

The following terminology and understanding was used in WG#2 discussions:

MULTIDIMENSIONAL – UN peace operations have evolved into a complex, multidimensional enterprise, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity, such as: security, rule of law', humanitarian assistance, governance, development, institution building, 'refugee return', 'disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), protection of civilians (PoC), recovery and reconstruction, confidence building, Anti-corruption, human rights, gender, mediation, and good offices.

MULTICULTURAL – referred to in some quarters as multifunctional or multidisciplinary or multi-professional. It includes military, police and civilians – with the additional understanding that there is more than one type of each, especially civilians. The inclusion of police is important because in the UN, and in most other forums, all three professional cultures are a part of the basic definition and understanding of peace operations.

INTEGRATED – In operational terms, an 'integrated mission' is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional United Nations peace operation and the UN country team (UNCT), under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and his/her deputy. In the UN concept, the Mission reaches out to others in an effort to cooperate as operational partners. Other crisis response and stability operations use the term 'comprehensive approach' to describe the same concept of all contributors working together in some way to achieve a common vision.

In a training sense 'integrated' means to train together – military, police and civilians. It replaces the terminology 'joint training', in part because 'joint' in the military means something else (various branches of the services working together).

PEACE OPERATIONS – replaces peacekeeping in UN circles, as a result of the recent High Level Panel Report. It has long been the accepted term in most countries, regional organizations and NATO. It also encompasses or replaces Peace Support Operations for purposes of the WG discussions.

SENIOR MISSION LEADERS EDUCATION AND TRAINING WG #2 REPORT

THE CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN-MILITARY-POLICE RELATIONS

There are many challenges and impediments to civilian-military-police relations, especially to fostering closer cooperation and coordination. The following is a partial list of such challenges identified by the PKSOI community of practice:

- a. Professional cultural differences – each group has its own way of doing things. The military chain of command often frustrates certain civilian groups. The relatively flat and often informal structures of some civilian groups is equally challenging for the military. Moreover, civilian objectives normally have a different (longer) timeline than military operations.
- b. Language and communications – the professional acronyms and slang of each different group (military, civilian and police) create problems of understanding, and hinder effective communication.
- c. Leadership and personalities – Various different styles of leadership within all functional groups are often not suited to encouraging teamwork within an organization, or partnerships with other organizations. Personalities become critical in shaping the attitudes of subordinates towards cooperation with other groups, especially those of senior leadership.
- d. Mandates – Institutional mandates can often be rigid and/or interpreted too strictly, leading some to believe that the task at hand is their responsibility, and theirs alone. Mission mandates can also be interpreted differently, depending upon the interests and roles of those doing the interpreting.
- e. Resources – With the exception of the military, all others are in a competition for resources. This leads to civilian, and even police organizations, presenting ‘best case scenarios and the illusion of considerable progress,’ often through misleading or marginally relevant statistics. The military usually and consistently errs on the side of caution and presents worst-case scenarios.
- f. Levels of authority and accountability – Different management structures and concepts delegate different levels of authority to various levels of management. Some organizations, mainly civilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and roving ambassadors, have considerable authority to take decisions at a local level; others have to seek authority from their mission operational headquarters; while some others need certain authority from offshore or from their national or regional headquarters.
- g. Overstretch or workload – One impediment to developing relations with others in a mission environment is simply “too much work”. If overcommitted, it is easy to simply focus on one’s main task and mandate, and ignore the possibilities or necessities of working with other functional organizations.
- h. Trust and confidentiality – The military over-classifies everything and, at times, civilians fail to adequately classify key information. Moreover, there is a built-in lack of confidence in others, even mistrust, when leadership and key staffs know little about the capabilities and roles of others.

- i. Ignorance – In many cases sheer ignorance is responsible for poor civilian-military-police relations. This is based simply on a lack of both adequate pre-mission training and education in civilian-military-police relations concerning the roles, responsibilities, capabilities and limitations of others.
- j. Misunderstandings – As examples, there is a belief that ‘civilians work from 9 to 5;’ conversely there is a belief that ‘all those military trucks should be available to support civilian organizations.’ There are many other such simple examples of misunderstandings among the various mission components. Advance education and training is critical.
- k. Realities and dilemmas – Civilians in a mission do not understand or appreciate military rotation every 6 or even 12 months. Militaries often do not appreciate the long-term visions of non-military organizations. There are also significant differences in approach to planning and setting priorities. These are realities and must not become obstacles – they need to be worked around, through cooperation, understanding and, where necessary, through compromise.
- l. National interests – These may differ among troop contributing countries and donors of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, thus coloring attitudes to mandates, costs and priorities.

ANNEX C

Competency Model for Civil - Military Teaming

Excerpt from the February 2012 Fact Sheet on U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) developed report. Recommends competency model comprised of three higher order meta-competencies: Adapts Across Organizations and Cultures, Builds Partnering Relationships, and Collaborates to Solve Problems and twelve competencies:

Meta-Competency	Competency
Adapts Across Organizations and Cultures	1 Understands the cultural context of situations
	2 Assesses new cultural environments & adjusts appropriately (cultural agility)
	3 Understands multiple perspectives
Builds Partnering Relationships	4 Understands capabilities of partners & systems
	5 Establishes effective partnerships & teams
	6 Develops positive relationships
	7 Builds common ground & shared purpose
	8 Manages conflict
	9 Manages the flow of communication
Collaborates to Solve Problems	10 Uses integrative methods for planning & problem-solving
	11 Synchronizes tactical actions, operational objectives, & strategic goals
	12 Applies available resources & expertise

